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Abstract 
Internet-based electronic markets facilitate buyer search for seller 
offerings and comparison of products on the basis of price and prod- 
uct features. Search engine capabilities such as Recall, Precision and 
Ranking Accuracy determine the efficiency with which buyers can 
search for and compare products and the resulting buyer surplus and 
seller profits. This research investigates the impact of each of these fac- 
tors on buyer and seller strategies at equilibrium. This paper explains 
certain counter intuitive market phenomena where some successful 
electronic markets offer less choice to buyers than their competitors. 
The analysis is driven by a set of analytical models of an electronic 
market under varying conditions of sellers' market shares, buyer search 
strategies and search engine technology. The models developed here 
draw from existing theories in information economics and computer 
science. The results demonstrate that precision has a greater direct 
impact on buyer surplus than recall and that buyers will forego some 
choice in exchange for greater accuracy of product description, espe- 
cially in products that are complex or are characterized by ambiguity 
in product description and terms of trade. Finally, the seller with the 
greatest market share stands to gain most from offering search engine 
services to buyers and in a market characterized by two or more sellers 
with significant market shares, search engine services will always be 
offered free of cost to buyers. 
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1 Introduction 
The Internet has emerged as  an effective forum for electronic commerce that 
integrates widely dispersed buyers and sellers and encourages them to trans- 
act by adopting both synchronous and asynchronous buying and selling ac- 
tivities. This in t u n  has resulted in the rapid growth of Internet based 
electronic markets. There are nuerous products that are being bought and 
sold on the Internet. The following examples serve to illustrate a trend: Cisco 
Systems, a network equipment manufacturer that sells products born its web 
site amounting to $1 billion a year, General Electric buys $1 billion worth of 
goods from On-line suppliers, Dell Computers sells $ 1 million worth of PC's 
a day on the Web[Anderson 971. 
Electronic markets are not restricted to a class of products such as Corn- 
puters and Software or to a type of transaction such as inter-firm buying and 
selling. A survey published in 1997 by ComrnerceNet, Nielsen, a media re- 
search firm, found that 73% of Internet users had used the web for shopping 
in one way or the other in the past month. A survey published in March 
1997 by ComrnerceNet/Nielsen found that while 53% of Internet users in 
Canada had used the Internet to reach a decision on a purchase, just 15% 
carried out the final transaction on the web.[Anderson 971This trend serves 
to highlight another important feature of electronic markets - electronic mar- 
kets offer buyers a convenience; the ability to search for products, research 
the offerings that have been identified and compare the offerings based on 
the product's features, quality and price at a (comparatively) low cost. The 
ability of electronic markets to enable search and comparison contributes 
si@cantly to the buyers' decision to buy a seller offering. 
Electronic markets make it possible for buyers to access and evaluate 
product offerings from different sellers and compare the product offerings 
available in the market. The availability of search engines which lower the 
costs of searching will result in a move toward frictionless and competitive 
markets and lower ~rices. [Bakos 19871 [Bakos 19911 This observation moti- 
vates an issue central to this research. This paper will examine the impact 
of search engine technology on market outcomes in an electronic market and 
examine how market welfare and buyer surplus are affected by choice of tech- 
nological features. 
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Two factors that determine whether electronic markets will truly deliver 
the benefits to buyers from competition amongst sellers are: the number of 
seller oflerings featured in the market and the accuracy of product represen- 
tation and description. 
Since electronic markets are an emerging phenomenon, the number of 
products in an electronic market is often a fraction of the number and va- 
riety of products found in traditional marketplaces. Since the extent of 
competition between sellers in an electronic market is determined by the 
number of products in the market, t h s  factor can impact buyer welfare in 
an marketplace. Electronic markets reduce buyer search costs in identify- 
ing suitable products and comparing them across sellers based on price and 
terms of trade. In order that the benefits of reduced transactions be realized 
by buyers, it is necessary that the products are accurately represented in a 
searchable database and the search engine is able to precisely match prod- 
uct features with buyers' preferences. If a search results in several poorly 
matched products being returned, buyers will have to inspect each product 
in considerable detail before they can identify a candidate product that max- 
imizes their utility from purchase. Since extensive human inspection can be a 
costly process, especially in the case of information rich products or products 
whose attributes are subject to considerable ambiguity in terms of trade and 
transaction settlement, buyers may well settle for sub-optimal products to 
minimize inspection costs1. Therefore, the accuracy of the search engine can 
be a crucial factor in determining market outcomes such as seller profits and 
buyer welfare in a market for differentiated products. 
Both these factors search engine accuracy and market coverage (number 
of products in the market) have cost implications. Accuracy of the search en- 
gine depends on the granularity of the search engine's internal representation 
mechanism and the extent to which it has to process product descriptions 
in order to match them to buyer specifications. The extent of market cov- 
erage implies the number of products that are indexed and stored by the 
search engine in an searchable repository (database) and it is reasonable to 
argue that larger the repository, greater the cost of sorting, indexing and 
maintenance. An increase in the number of products in the market with a 
simultaneous increase in accuracy, can have a combined effect on cost of o p  
eration that exceeds the resulting increase in buyer welfare. While reduced 
lBuyers will actually minimize the total costs resulting from product inspection, search, 
price and disutility of the candidate product. 
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transaction costs benefits of electronic markets accrue to buyers, the result- 
ing operational costs of search engine have to be borne by sellers or buyers 
or some combination of both2. This motivates yet another issue that this 
research will address; the conditions that make it optimal for sellers to offer 
search engine services to buyers. In summary the three questions that are 
addressed by this research are as follows: 
1. Mihat are the impacts of market coverage3 (number of products in the 
market) and search accuracy4 on buyers and sellers5? 
2. When a trade off has to be made between extent of market coverage 
and accuracy, which factor has greater impact on buyer welfare? 
3. Under what conditions will sellers offer search services free of cost to 
buyers? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, different 
aspects of search engine technology will be discussed and the terms that will 
be employed in the modeling and analysis exercise will be defined rigorously. 
In section 3 the base model is developed and in section 4, the factor of imper- 
fect recall is added to the model. In section 5 the model further developed 
by considering the impact of imperfect precision. In section 6, conclusions 
and directions for further research are presented. The bulk of analysis and 
modeling are in sections 3,4 and 5 where closed form equations that represent 
different phenomena under analysis, are derived and discussed. 
Impact of Search Engines on Electronic Mar- 
2Third parties may provide search engines and charge buyers and sellers for their ser- 
vices. 
3The term Recall that will be defined in section I1 is a precise measure of market 
coverage. 
4Search Engine accuracy will be measured by "Precision", a term that will be defined 
in Section 11. 
jThe impact on buyers and sellers will be analyzed in terms of total welfare of the 
market and buyer surplus wherever appropriate. 
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kets 
The role played by search engines assumes considerable significance due to 
two different but not unrelated characteristics of electronic markets: 
1. Electronic markets are characterized by their global reach which has 
resulted in a large number of geographically distributed participants 
transacting on a forum that lacks structure or universally defined and 
accepted standards for specification of the terms of trade. 
2. The proliferation of a variety of products and sellers who offer these 
products. In electronic markets for products such as books, music, 
computers, cars, airline tickets etc. there is considerable variety in 
product offerings resulting in a high degree of product difierentiation 
and several sellers for any given product. 
2.0.1 A n  Overview of t h e  Role of Search in  Seller Location and 
Pricing 
The study of a firm's strategic choices over price andfor location withn spa- 
tial models has been studied by several researchers following the work of 
Hotelling in 1929 [Hotelling 19291. Takahashi and Andre de Palma observed 
that the introduction of space relaxes price competition between firms be- 
cause firms scattered over geographical space acquire some degree of monopoly 
power [Depalrna 19791. Hotelling, Greenhut, Norman and Hung have pointed 
out that the spatial model can be interpreted as a model of product loca- 
tion in characteristics space, allowing it to be extended to describe compe- 
tition among firms selling products with horizontally differentiated qualities 
[Greenhut 19871. 
The dimension of search in spatially distributed markets has been stud- 
ied by different authors following Stigler 's seminal work (1961) titled "The 
economics of Information" in which he explained the causes for price dis- 
persion, impact of search costs on buyers and sellers and the factors that 
gave firms monopoly pricing power[Stigler 19611. It has been shown by Di- 
amond (1971) that under certain assumptions of buyer behavior and in the 
presence of search costs, at equilibrium, all sellers charge the same price 
[Diamond 19711. This result was extended by Salop and Stiglitz (1977) to 
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show that the equilibrium price charged by all sellers is the price that would 
have been charged by a monopolist[Salop 19771. The restrictive nature of 
these models were analyzed by Bakos who observed that the models suffered 
from the following limitations[Bakos 19911 : 
I .  Variability of seller prices was exogenous and disappeared when the 
models were closed allowing profit maximizing behavior on the seller 
side. The equilibrium price converged to an identical price across all 
sellers. 
2. The absence of price dispersion at equilibrium meant that buyers had 
no motivation to search which undermined the original prernise of the 
models. 
These models did succeed in demonstrating that even small search costs 
could lead to prices substantially higher than marginal costs when sellers be- 
haved competitively. The impact of search engine technology on an electronic 
market has not been studied by economists since search engines are recent 
phenomena. This is an emerging area in the field of electronic commerce and 
represents the technological frontier in the retrieval of Web based distributed 
informat ion. 
2.1 Directed Search and Random Search 
The phenomenon of search and its impact on prices, seller location and buyer 
behavior has been extensively studied in economics. It is necessary to point 
out an important difference in meanings of the term search as it has been 
used in economics and the concept of search as used in the context of this 
research. In economics, search is essentially seen as random search where 
buyers (or sellers) have to search a bounded space (usually geographically 
bounded) for the existence of sellers or for the existence of products that 
match their requirements. The buyer has no way of ascertaining if some 
locations are more likely to  have sellers than others, nor does she have a way 
of selectively excluding (or including) certain products or features of products 
from her search space. In the case of random search, a buyer cannot begin 
by excluding products beyond a certain price range from her search space. 
In other words, buyers do no t  have the  ability t o  refine the search space 
by excluding certain products based on either price or one or more product 
features. As opposed to this, I use the term Search to indicate Directed 
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Search using a search engine, where the buyer has the capacity to include 
or exclude several areas of the search space from the search by specifying 
features of the product to the search engine. The process of Directed Search 
is characterized by the following search features: 
1. Buyers can specify a product space that is to be searched based on 
either the product features or sellers7 characteristics. 
2. Buyers can restrict the search space to products within a pre-determined 
price range. 
3. Buyers can specify price-product feature combinations to the search 
engine that define the search space. 
4. Buyers can specify a search order, which results in the search engine 
searching certain sub-spaces &st before it searches others. 
These factors make the role of search and search engines specially signifi- 
cant in electronic markets. Search Engine features such as Recall, Precision 
and ILanking Accuracy can influence the behavior of buyers and sellers 
and can have an impact on the price discovery mechanism as well as price 
dispersion in these markets. 
2.2 Recall and Precision 
These terms have their origins in the field of information retrieval [?I. In the 
field of information retrieval, recall refers to the fraction of relevant docu- 
ments that are retrieved from the universe of all documents that satisfy the 
search conditions. In the context of electronic markets, a search engine's re- 
call is the ratio of the number of relevant seller offerings indexed and stored 
in the search engine's database to the total number of relevant seller offerings 
in the market. Consider the following example. A search engine operating 
in a market for cameras has a collection of 15 cameras in its database that 
match a set of buyer preferences out of a total of 20 cameras in the market 
that satisfy the same set of specifications. The recall of this search engine is 
said to be 0.75 (g = 0.75) . More formally, recall is defined as follows: 
Number of products retrieved that meet the buyer's search criteria 
= Total number of products that meet the buyer's search criteria in the market 
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Intuitively, it is clear that in an electronic market for a differentiated 
product, a search engine with a higher recall retrieves both a greater variety 
and a greater number of products. 
Precision measures the relevance of the items that are retrieved by the 
search engine. Search engines that operate in the domain of document re- 
trieval rank the results of search and provide confidence scores for each doc- 
ument. The extent to which the confidence score matches the relevance of 
the document depends on the precision of the search engine. Similarly in 
an electronic market, the search engine estimates the utility of each product 
to the buyer based on the buyer's preferences. Greater the precision of the 
search engine, closer is the estimate to the actual utility of the product to 
the buyer. F'rom here onwards, the term disutility rather than utility will 
be employed in analysis and modeling. Since a buyer a specifies his ideal 
product to  the search engine, all products other than her ideal product have 
disutility implications to the buyer. It is this disutility that will be sought 
to be minimized in the modeling that follows. Precision is defined in terms 
of disutility as follows: 
Actual Disutility of the Product - Estimated Disutility of the Product] p = l - /  
Actual Ilisutility of the Product 
Poor precision in a search engine results in inaccurate estimates of prod- 
ucts' location in product space which necessitates buyer inspection of seller 
offerings. 
3 Model of an Electronic Market with a Search 
Engine 
In this section analytical models will be developed to investigate the three 
issues discussed earlier. Each model will be followed by analysis and a brief 
discussion of findings. The models are defined in terms of certain factors 
that drive market outcomes such as buyer and seller surplus, fees that sellers 
can charge for use of search engines and seller profits when they offer search 
engines. These factors are: recall, precision, cost of technology, market size, 
market shares of different sellers and cost of inspecting products (incurred 
by buyers). 
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3.1 Outline of the Model 
I present a model of an electronic market containing buyers and sellers and an 
electronic search mechanism (which will be referred to as the search engine), 
that allows buyers to specify their preferences and locate seller offerings. 
There are some basic features that are applicable to all the situations that 
will be discussed in the sections that follow. These are: the product space, 
seller offerings, buyers characteristics and the search process. A basic model 
with these features as the primitives of modeling will be created and specific 
complexities such as imperfect recall and precision will be added to augment 
the models in later sections. 
3.2 Product Space 
The market consists of a highly differentiated product6 that has a location in 
two dimensional space given by two coordinates (x, y). The product (or ser- 
vice) may have several attributes. The attributes themselves can be classified 
into two mutually exclusive categories. An attribute is either characterized 
by a simple product description that can be unambiguously understood by 
a search engine or it has a complex product description and has numerous 
conditions associated with it7. 
To understand what these terms mean, consider the following example. 
Airline tickets can be said to have two kinds of attributes. The departure 
time, flying time and arrival time are all unambiguously described and can 
be understood by a search engine. The maximum number of stopovers, the 
minimum and maximum separation (in terms of number of days) between 
onward and return trips, the minimum notice period for cancellation, the 
cancellation fee etc. are all subject to restrictions. VVhile a seller may list a 
cancellation fee as $50, the actual amount may be greater depending on a set 
of rules (cancellation fee for promotional offers may be higher, the charges 
may be higher for certain times of the year when travel is volume is lower etc.) 
The minimum notice period or the cancellation fee may also depend on the 
conditions under which the ticket is offered or on the number of stopovers 
6This anlysis would hold for a differentiated service as well. 
?Both kinds of attributes, simple and complex, used in this model are measurable. 
Attributes that are not measurable such as color, texture etc., will not be considered. 
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For expositional simplicity, we refer to  the two sets of attributes as simple 
and complex attributes in the remainder of this dissertation. The resultant 
of all simple attributes is represented by x (which is a combination of these 
values according to some predefined rule). Similarly, those attributes that 
are complex (but measurable nevertheless) have a resultant value (calculated 
by combining the measured values according to some mathematical function) 
y . Together, the two dimensions define a product uniquely. 
3.3 Seller Offerings 
1. Two products that vary in even one attribute, will have two different 
coordinates in product space. Therefore, each seller offering is uniquely 
represented by a point in space. 
2. There are No seller offerings in the market (where No is some suitably 
large number) all of which are priced at the same price = P*. 
3. There are N seller offerings which are uniformly and randomly dis- 
tributed within the buyer's search domains. 
3.4 Buyers 
Figure 2 below is a graplcal representation of Buyers Preferences distributed 
along the two dimensions of product differentiation. 
1. Buyers' product preferences are heterogenous and randomly distributed 
along the same two dimensions (see Figure 2). 
2. A Buyer's preferences define her ideal product, whose location is given 
by (xo,yo)  in product space. The buyer experiences a disutility for 
products whose attribute values do not coincide with her ideal prod- 
uct's attribute values. This disutility or cost of mismatch is a function 
of the distances between the seller offering's attribute values and the 
buyer's ideal product attribute values. In this model, buyers have an 
8The term search domain is the area arround the buyer's position in which the buyer 
will search. A buyer will not look for products outside this area. We will define this term 
precisely in the section that follows. 
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Boundaries of Buver's Search Area 
Figure 1: Boundaries of Buyer Search 
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identical cost of mismatch t ,  which is known to sellers. The value of 
this parameter is stored in the search engine. 
A buyer who is located at [xotyo] experiences a disutility for a seller 
offering located at [x l , y l ]  which is given by9: 
3. A buyer can search for products and inspect the products that are 
returned by the search engine. In general, the ith seller offering (xi, yi) ,  
located at a distances of xi and yi from the location of the buyer ((as 
shown in Figure 2), along the two product dimensions and whose price 
is given by P*, has a disutility level associated with it, which is given 
by: 
The expression above is the sum of the two disutilities from product 
features and price that the buyer incurs. Since the buyer has no control 
over the price, she will search in such a way as to min imize  her  total 
disutility f rom the product she eventually buys and the  search costs that 
she incurs in finding it. 
4. All buyers have identical reserve utilities of Uo. Since the price of the 
product is P* the maximum disutility that the buyer will suffer from 
product mismatch is given by: U = Uo - P*. A buyer will not search 
for products that lie outside the region defined by the four equations: 
1x1 + t 1 y1 < U (refer to  Figure 1). 
gWe associate a penalty of t l  for unit distance deviation from the ideal attribute along 
the X coordinate dimension and t2 for unit distance deviation from the ideal attribute 
along Y coordinate dimension, resulting in an equation that looks like this: 
Dividing both sides by tiand substituting D = 2 and t = 2 we have: 
This gives us the cornparitive importance of the dimension Y. We will derive results 
based on the parameter t and comment on its significance wherever appropriate. 
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3.5 Search 
1. Each search costs the same (for each buyer) and the search cost is 
represented by C. 
2. The search mechanism available in the electronic market allows buyers 
to specify a range of acceptable product characteristics. For example, 
a buyer can request products located in the [0.4,0.8] interval along the 
X dimension and in the [0.2,0.5] interval along the Y dimension. T h s  
range defines the maximum disutility that the buyer will endure before 
she exits the market. 
Since the search engine is assumed to have access to both the simple and 
complex attributes of a product, it assigns a position in product space 
(based on the product features) to each seller offering. The search 
engine will search for all products that will provide the buyer with 
a disutility less than or equal to U. Initially, we will assume that 
the search engine can exhaustively examine every seller offering and 
return all sellers who meet buyers' search criteria. We will relax this 
assumption later and examine the impact of less than perfect recall and 
precision in the search technology. 
4. When the buyer searches in her search domain, the search engine will 
return with all the products10 in the area and rank them in an ascending 
order of disutility (where the product that represents the least disutility 
for the buyer, is top ranked). The strategy adopted by the buyer to 
identify the candidate product depends on whether or not the search 
engine's precision is perfect. 
3.5.1 Perfect Recall and Perfect Precision 
1. When the search engine ranks products in an ascending order of disu- 
tility, the buyer will simply select the top ranked product since it is 
assured to be the best choice. 
1°The recall of the search engine is assumed to be perfect. The case when the recall is 
less than perfect will be examined in subsequent sections. 
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2. Under the above dispensation, the buyer's surplus is computed as fol- 
lows. 
Let the disutility of a product chosen at random from the search domain 
be represented by the random variable X. If N products are returned by 
the search engine and ranked in ascending order, Yl,Y2,Y3 ... Y, where Ylis 
the best product and Y, the worst, the vector Yl,Y2,Y3 ... Y, can be treated 
as composed of N samples of X and the probability density function of Yl, 
f (yl)is given by1' [Hogg 19951: 
From (I), the expected disutility value of the best product, i.e., x , i s  given 
by: 
3.5.2 Buyer Surplus 
Buyer surplus under perfect recall, can be derived from equation (2). Buyer 
Surplus B is given by: 
In later sections, the cost of operating the search engine will be factored 
into the calculation of buyer surplus. The loss of surplus has two components 
to it, the price of the product P*,the and the expected disutility of the 
candidate product which is given by the expression in equation (2) 
lThe expression for order statistic is applied here where YI< Y2 < .. . < YN denotes the 
order statistics of a sample of size N. 
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Imperfect Recall 
In a survey of several search engines such as Alta Vista, Excite, Lycos, and 
electronic markets that are currently operational, such as Expedia, [Expedia 19981, 
Travelocity [Travelocity 19981 ,SurplusAuction [SurplusAuction 19981, and struc- 
tured search engines for locating products, such as CNet [?I, etc. it was o b  
served that the search engines' recall was less than perfect. When a buyer 
searched the product space based on a set of parameters, the search engine 
returned some fraction of the product space. If the buyer searched with the 
same parameters again, the same set of products were returned. In order 
to view a different set of products or expand the results of her search, the 
buyer had to change her search criteria. A set of search parameters uniquely 
determined the results of the search for a given level of recall. 
In the model under discussion, the search engine periodically captures a 
fraction of products in the market, records them in a retrievable database. 
Buyers can search the search engine's database and buy only those products 
that have been captured by the search engine and indexed by it. Products 
that are not indexed in one period may (or may not) be captured in a subse- 
quent period. Further, products that arrive in the market (or sellers who are 
new entrants) in a particular period may be captured by the search engine 
in subsequent periods and indexed. For the remainder of this paper, the 
discussion will be restricted to a single period and comparative statics will 
be employed to explain phenomena that take place within a single period. 
Thus, accretion or diminution of sellers over time will not impact the results. 
Each attribute of each product is examined by the search engine and the 
product is accorded a position in product space. In this model, the products 
that are captured and indexed by the search engine are uniformly distributed 
in the buyer's search domain. 
4.0.3 Disutility of the Candidate Product Under Imperfect Recall 
Buyers specify their search parameters (their location in product space and 
the value of t )  and the search engine will retrieve pN products from the 
search domain. At p = 1,buyer surplus12 is maximized and the expected 
disutility of the resulting best product is given by equation (3). 
12As before, the cost of operating the search engine is ignored in calculating the buyer 
surpIus here. It will be factored into the calculations in the sections that follow. 
15 
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For imperfect recall, i.e. 0 5 p < 1, the expected disutility of the resulting 
best product is derived by substituting pN for N in equation (2). Which 
results in: 
4.0.4 Costs Associated with Recall: 
There are say, N products in the market and nlof these representing some 
fraction p of the market have been captured by the search engine. The search 
engine has to perform some operations to capture the nl different products 
and record them . We will model the cost of capturing products, FC as a 
function of nl given by: 
Where al l  is a constant that represents a fixed number of preparatory 
operations (such as loading and closing databases etc.) that need be per- 
formed prior to and after recording the products and bl is a constant that 
represents the number of binary operations required to record a product in 
the database. 
Once recorded, each time the buyer executes a search query, the engine 
will have to perform some operations to retrieve the products that meet the 
buyer's search criteria. The cost of retrieval, FT, is modeled as  a function of 
nl given by: 
Where a2 and b2 are constants similar to a1 and bl. 
Finally, the search engine will have to sort an unsorted list of n1 products 
and rank them in ascending order of disutility. The number of operations 
required to achieve this is of the order13 of 0 (nlLog(nl)) .We will model this 
as a function of nl given by: 
13From the Optimality Theorem of Sorting which states that an unsorted list of length 
= N can be sorted at best in 0 (NLog (N)) operations. 
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Given that the impact of G dominates Fc and FT, for larger values of n l ,  
cp(nl) = Fc ( n l )  + FT (n l )  + G (n l )  , can be rewritten as: 
If the cost per operation is set at some constant Kl l ,  then cost of operating 
the search engine will amount to: 
where Kl = K x Kll 
Since nl = pN , the cost of recall for a market size N is given by: 
4.1 Welfare Under Imperfect Recall 
Since this model addresses the impact of search engine technology on buyer 
and seller strategies and sellers' costs are exogenous to the model and not 
relevant to the current discussion, the term welfare will be restricted to mean 
the difference of buyer surplus and the costs of offering search engine tech- 
nology. Welfare in the market is given by: 
Buyer Surplus at a level of Recall p, - costs of technology at that level of 
recall. This is given by: 
From equations (3), (4) and ( 5 ) ,  WR can be rewritten as: 
Lemma 1 For any given Market Size, N ,  there exists a welfare maximizing 
level of Recall, p. 
Proof: From equation (6), WR can be re-written as: 
J.irUGamma [pN -k 11 
m e r e  : D ( p ,  N )  = 
ZGamma [i + p ~ ]  
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-98-26 
Case 1: F = 0,for some value of p. 
Taking first order conditions for WR w.r.t. p : 
dWR - [Dl (P, N) + c; (P, N)] dp 
Since14 D' (p, N)  < 0 and Ck (p, N) > 0, 
and further ICk (p, N)I > ID' (p, N)J  for some p > po depending on N 
and Kl ,  
it follows that if = 0 for some p = p,,then at that value of p,, WR 
attains a maximum1% .his is the welfare maximizing level of Recall (p,). 
Case 2: # 0 for any p. 
Since, ICk (p, N) J > ID' (p, N) I for all p > p,, 
d W  
and y.$ = - [o (P, N) + Ck (P, N ) ]  ,
it follows that < 0 'd p G [0, 1] . 
In this case the function attains a maximum at p = 0, and the buyer will 
exit the market without searchng for any products. 
4.1.1 Impact of Cost of Technology and Market Size on Welfare 
In this section the impact of market size and cost of technology on buyer 
surplus will be discussed. Market size impacts buyer surplus in two confiict- 
ing ways. As the number of products increases, the expected disutility of 
the candidate product decreases thereby increasing the buyer surplus. The 
intuition behind this is that as market size increases, there are more products 
within the buyer's search domain and therefore, the best product (the one 
'closest' to the buyer) is found closer to a buyer's location than in a sparser 
market. 
As market size increases, the cost of indexing and retrieving products 
increases thereby increasing the overall cost of operating a search engine in 
the market. The gains that accrue to the buyer from increase in market are 
partly or wholly offset by the increased cost of operating the search engine. 
l%ince the derivative of D (P, N) involves PolyGamma Functions, a formal proof is not 
included here. The proposition was verified using Mathematica and the results will be 
made available by the author on request. 
15Since ICk (p, N) I > I Dl (p, N) I , for p > po,it follows that the derivative changes sign 
in a small interval Lirnh+, lol - h, pl + h] around p, . For all values of p > p,, < 0. 
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Intuitively, it is clear that the welfare maximizing level of recall of the search 
engine will reflect the trade-off between the two conflicting effects. 
The level of recall that maximizes the welfare will also be impacted by 
the costs of technology. In equation (6), cost of technology is represented 
by the term Kl.  As Kl increases, it is clear that increase in market size 
will be met by a decrease in recall and vice versa. To examine the combined 
impact of cost of technology and market size on buyer surplus, three different 
technology cost regimes will be considered. These regimes will be called 
"High Cost Regime", "Moderate Cost Regime" and "Low Cost Regime". 
The technology cost discriminant term will vary by a multiple of 10 across 
the three regimes. The high cost regime will feature a technology cost that is 
10 times the cost in the moderate cost regime and 100 times the cost factor of 
the low cost regime16. Similarly three market sizes will be considered, which 
correspond to "Large", "Moderate" and "Small" sized markets. 
Figure 2 srmxnarizes the relationship between recall, market size and 
welfare under the moderate technology costs regime. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
From Figure 2, it can be seen that for a small market, welfare increases 
with recall. For moderate and large market sizes, we can see that welfare is 
maximized at a relatively low level of recall (p = 0.2 or so) and for larger 
values of recall, welfare declines rapidly. 
Table 1 below Summarizes the impact of Market Size and Technology 
Costs on the welfare maximizing level of Recall. 
Table 1: Welfare maximizing level of Recall 
- 
I Techno lo~v  Cost Regime 1 I W" - 1 Market  Size / Low Cost 1 Moderate Cost I Hieh Cost 1 
I I I ., / small / 0.863 1 0.220 1 0.056 
Table 2 below Summarizes the impact of Market Size and Technology 
Costs on total welfare. 
16Since the focus of this discussicn is on providing comparisons of trends and drection 
of movements of different factors at equilibrium, the actual values of constants used in 
setting up the simulations are not meaningful. 
I 
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0.044 
0.022 
Medium 
Laree 
0.011 
0.006 
0.173 
0.086 
I I , 
Large 1 0.867 / 0.746 1 0.552 1 
Table 2: Total Welfare 
In the case of recall, as Market size N ,  increases, the optimal level of 
recall decreases. Similarly as the cost of technology increases, the optimal 
level of recall decreases. In the case of total welfare, the impact of increase in 
cost of technology dominates all other effects. For a given cost of technology, 
the same level of optimal welfare can be preserved by decreasing the recall 
suitably. However, an increase in cost of technology results in some welfare 
loss that cannot be compensated by either a lower level of recall or by an 
increase in market size. Thus the cost of technology emerges as one of the 
key drivers of the success of an electronic market. 
Market  Size 
Small 
Medium 
5 Imperfect Precision & Imperfect Recall 
In the earlier section while discussing the recall of the search engine, it was 
assumed that the search engine was not inaccurate in estimating the utility 
of the products that were returned by the search. This assumption will now 
be relaxed and the impact of inaccuracies in the search engine's estimation 
of a product's utility will be examined. For instance, in a market for airline 
tickets, the search engine may have to examine ticketing codes and look into a 
dictionary of conditions to ascertain what rules and conditions apply to each 
ticket. The search engine may then have to infer the degree of fit between 
the buyer's specifications and the seller offering, and estimate the aggregate 
disutility of the product. The following features describe the model. 
Technology Cost Regime 
1. The results of the search are ranked in ascending order of disutility 
by the search engine. This ranking is inaccurate and a lower ranked 
product may in effect be a better match (lower level of disutility) than 
a higher ranked product. The disutility of the candidate product is a 
function of the following parameters in this model: 
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High Cost 
0.552 
0.552 
Low Cost 
0.867 
0.867 
Moderate Cost 
0.746 
0.746 
p : The base Precision17 of the search engine. The search engine's base 
precision can vary from 0 to 1 (perfect precision case). :. 0 < p < 1 
x : The number of inspections made by the buyer. The number of 
products a buyer inspects before she stops further inspection. 
N : The number of products within the buyer's search domain. 
r : The mean product rank of the x products inspected. 
If Up denotes the disutility of the best product (candidate product), in 
n inspections, then, Up = F (p, x, r, N). The exact functional form of 
F will be explicitly specified later. 
2. If the buyer inspects, say, x products, before stopping further inspec- 
tion, she will choose the best product from the x products examined 
until that point. Recording and retrieving the best product out of a 
sequence of x inspections is assumed to be costless. 
3. Mean Rank of Inspection: As the buyer inspects products in the 
ascending order of disutility the mean rank of the products inspected 
increases from 1 (corresponding to the first inspection) to after x 
inspections. If the buyer chooses to inspect products randomly (not 
according to their ranks) or by ignoring their rankings, then the mean 
rank will simply be the sum of the ranks of the products divided by the 
number of inspections1'. This definition will be used in the modeling 
constructs that follow. 
4. In the case of search engines that operate in the domain of document 
retrieval, there is greater uncertainty associated with the degree of fit 
of documents which contain fewer search parameters (keywords) than 
those that contain more search parameters. The search engine em- 
ployed by this model operates with an analogous logic. The precision 
of the search engine decays as the extent to which it has to  infer the 
degree of match between the product's attributes and buyer prefer- 
ences increases. Therefore, products that are close to buyer location in 
17The meaning of the term "base precision" will be explained later in this section. It 
can be thought of as the precision of the search engine when it estimates the disutilities 
of products closest to the buyer's position. 
18A buyer will not overlook the ranking scheme as it would be a sub-optimal inspection 
strategy. 
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product space have a lower uncertainty associated with their level of 
disutility as compared to products that are farther away from buyers 
As the rank of a product decreases (the best products are ranked high- 
est, and poorer matches are ranked lower) the degree of imprecision 
associated with the product increases. If the buyer inspects x (x > 1) 
products such that the mean rank of the products examined is r ,  then 
the mean precision of the search engine over the range of products in- 
spected is given by: pr = 1 - p(1 - f); where p is the precision of the 
search engine for the top ranked product which will be referred to as 
the base precision of the search engine. Given that a buyer will never 
inspect a lower ranked product before she inspects all higher ranked 
products, after x inspections, the mean precision of the search engine 
over the range of x inspections is given by1': 
For a given number of inspections, the disutility of the candidate prod- 
uct increases as the precision of the search engine decreases. Holding all 
other factors constant, the disutility of the best product is a decreasing 
function of the search engine's precision. Or: 
The base precision decreases as the number of inspections increase. Or: 
5. As the number of inspections increase, the disutility of the candidate 
product is impacted by two factors whose effects are in opposing direc- 
? ices. As the buyer inspects products sequentially, she may find better 
products which are lower ranked. However, as the buyer inspects lower 
ranked products, the mean precision over the inspection range decays 
and diminishes some of the gains of finding better products which are 
lower ranked. 
l g T  - C:=i ,, z+1 
5 2 
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If the buyer chooses to ignore the ranking of the search engine and 
inspects products either randomly or according to some other rule, she 
looses the value of information that is provided by the search engine. 
Holding all other factors constant, the disutility of the candidate prod- 
uct increases with increasing mean rank, r of inspection2'.0r: 
Since the buyer will always inspect the products in accordance with 
search engine's ranking scheme, the mean rank r of x products in- 
spected is r = ?. Therefore, when the buyer adopts an optimal in- 
spection strategy (that minimizes her product related disutility), each 
additional inspection will cause the mean rank of inspected products 
to increase by $ and the mean ranking will increase only if there one 
or more additional inspections have been made. In this model, when 
optimal inspection strategy is adopted by the buyer, the impact of ad- 
ditional inspection dominates the impact of decay of precision. This 
implies: 
Further, in this model of search, the rate of decrease in disutility in- 
creases with the number of inspections Or: 
6. W e n  a buyer has to inspect a product, she incurs an inspection cost 
of e. Each product inspection costs2' e. After an inspection, the buyer 
knows the exact disutility of the product with certainty. In this model, 
the buyer has to inspect a product that she chooses to buy, for reasons 
exogenous to the model. This is in keeping with the functioning of 
currently operational electronic markets (such say, Expedia, Carpoint, 
20A buyer could inspect products according to any rule or randomly and not necessarily 
according to the search engine's ranking. However, by this strategy would yield a sub- 
optimal solution. 
21This is the disutility the buyer experiences from having to spend the time and effort 
in inspecting the product. 
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Auto-by-tel etc.) where buyers must inspect products and indicate that 
they are in agreement with terms of trade for regulatory and contract 
enforcement reasons. 
7. If the buyer inspects x products before stopping, the buyer's tot a1 disu- 
tility is given by: 
Since r = y, under optimal inspection strategy, the function will be 
given by x,  p,  e and N .  
In the next section some results will be derived using the general func- 
tional form in equation (5). These results will then be interpreted by resorting 
to simulations by attributing numerical values to the modeling primitives. 
Optimal Inspection Strategy: The buyer will inspect the product until 
she reaches the point of optimal disutility. Applying first order conditions, 
we have: 
Equation (10) has a solution for a large enough value of e for a given 
set of parameters {p, N). Let p = {pl, Nl  , el) : Dx (x, yl) = 0. Given that 
Fx, > 0 and Fx < 0, the equation D, (x, yl) = 0, has a unique solution22. 
Lemma 2 For any market size, N level of Precision p, and inspection cost 
e there i s  an  optimal level of inspection that minimizes buyer disutility. 
Proof: Two cases will be considered which correspond to equation (6) 
having either no solutions or exactly one solution23. 
Case 1: Let Q = {pl, Nl, e l )  : Dx (x,yl)  # 0. If Dx (x,yl)  > 0, then the 
buyer's net disutility increases with each additional inspection. The benefits 
2 2  D, (Ti) = 0 =+ Fz ( x , q )  = - e l  
Since F,, > 0, if F, (xl ,Ti) = F, (x2, K )  = -e,then XI = x2. Thus D, (Ti) = 0 has a 
unique solution for a given Ti. 
23Equation (6) cannot have more than one solution, as discussed earlier. 
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of finding a better product are offset by the inspection cost at the very 
first inspection thereby mahng it suboptimal for the buyer to inspect any 
further. The optimal inspection strategy results in the top ranked product 
being chosen as the candidate product, since each inspection will result in 
higher net disutility. If D, ( x , ~ )  < 0, the buyer will inspect all products. 
Since the net disutility declines with each additional inspection, the optimal 
strategy results in buyer inspecting all the products returned by the search 
engine exhaustively. 
Case 2: Dx ( x , ~ )  = 0, for some x = xl. The lernrna is proved if it is 
established that, at x = xl, D (x,yl)  attains a minimum. value or D ( x l , ~ )  
is a global minimum of the function D (x, q) . This will be proved by adopting 
proof by contradiction. 
Since D, (xl , Ti) = 0,if x = x1 is not a minimum value of the function 
then it is either a point of inflection or a global maximum value2*. If it is 
a point of infiection, then in an interval [xl - h, xl + h] , D, (xl , q) will not 
change sign. But D, (xl - h, yl) = F, (xl - h, F) + e and Dx (xl + h, yl) = 
F,(x~ + h , E )  + e  
From equation (5), it follows that: 
Therefore xl is not a point of inflection. If xlwas a global m a x i m  
then D (xl , yl) > D (xl + 1, E) and D (xl - 1, yl) < D (xl , yl) . T h s  implies 
that: 
F(xl, l i i ;)+xle > F ( x l + l , ~ ) + ( x l + l ) e = + F ( x l , ~ ) - F ( x l + l , ~ ) > e  
And 
F ( x l - l , y l ) + ( x l - 1 ) e  < F ( x l l i ? ; ) + x l e = + F ( x l - - l , ~ ) - F ( x l l ~ ) < e  
Since F,, (x, q) > 0 'd  from equation (5)) it follows that: 
F(XI -1,F) - F ( x l , y l )  > F  XI,^) - F ( x l  + 1 , ~ )  
F ( x l  - 1 , ~ )  - F ( x l , E )  > e 
241t cannot be a local minimum or a local maximum since there is exactly one solution 
to the equation, D, (x, i7;) = 0. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-98-26 
Therefore, XI is not a global maximum. Hence x1 is a global minimum. 
Therefore, the buyer's optimal inspection level is to stop after XI inspections. 
C ~ r ~ d i d a t e  Product: In the previous sections several conditions the de- 
fined the behavior of the search engine under imperfect precision were dis- 
cussed. Further, it was showed that the search engine's precision decayed 
as the mean rank of the products inspected increased. The search engine's 
precision for the ith product was given by: pi = 1 - p (1 - 5) (from equa- 
tion (7))) where p is the base precision of the search engine or simply, the 
precision of the search engine. 
Disutility Differentia1 If the search engine retrieves n products, the 
expected value of the disutility of the best product is given byz5: 
. The expected value of the worst product (worst fit with buyer's prefer- 
ences) is given byz6: 
The disutili ty differential is the difference in disutility between the best 
and worst product in the market. This is given by: 
25This result follows directly from equation ( 2 ) .  
26Derived by applying the nthorder statistic for n independent samples from a dstribu- 
tion. 
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Disutility of the  Candidate Product: As the buyer examines more 
and more products, it is intuitively clear that the disutility of the candidate 
product should decrease, even as she incurs increasing costs of inspection. 
Further, if the buyer were to inspect most of the products retrieved and 
ranked (imperfectly) by the search engine, the disutility of the candidate 
product should be very close (in value) to the disutihty of the best product 
in the l i ~ t ~ ~ . T h e  disutility of the candidate product after say, x inspections 
is given by the disutility of the best product plus some declining function of 
the disutility differential. This implies that as the buyer inspects more and 
more products, the disutility of the candidate product declines to the value 
of the disutility of the best product. Combining equations (7), (9) and (11) , 
the expression that gives the value of the disutility of the candidate product 
after x inspections is given by: 
From equations (9) and (12), the total disutility of the candidate product 
is given by: 
27The best product retrieved by the search engine need not necessarily be the top ranked 
product. In this model, however, as the buyer inspects more and more products it is less 
and less likely that the best product is to be found in the remaining uninspected collection 
of lower ranked products. 
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5.0.2 Costs Associated With Precision 
Since a search engine must perform a certain number of operations in order 
to achieve a level of precision, it is reasonable to associate a cost structure 
with a search engine's precision. In this paper, the cost of achieving a level of 
precision is modeled as a quadratic function of the level of precision achieved. 
A brief discussion of how the cost function was derived is provided below. 
Let there be m imprecision (ambiguity) inducing parameters associated 
with each product. Together they can be present in 2" different ways2". In 
this model, in order to be able to exhaustively eliminate all possibilities a 
search engine has to make 2m x 2" discrete operations. When all m pararn- 
eters are present (the search engine has not eliminated any parameters), let 
A . When the search the precision of the search engine be given by2g: pm = 
engine has eliminated some parameters (m - ml) and there are ml param- 
A eters that have not been eliminated, the precision is given by: pml = =. 
Number of operations that are needed to eliminate ml parameters is given 
by: 2("--"l) x 2("-"l). If the cost of performing an operation is given by KO, 
then cost of a precision level p, is given by: 
In general, 
5.0.3 Welfare Under Imperfect Precision 
As before, Total Welfare in the market will be given by the difference of 
Buyer Surplus at a level of Precision p, and the cost of operating the search 
"The number of different combinations in which rn parameters that may impact a 
particular product is given by: 
2gThe precision of the search engine is never 0. It varies between & and 1. 
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engine at that level of precision. This is given by: 
When the dimension of Recall is considered, then equations (5) and (14) 
can be combined to yield, the welfare under a level of ~ e c a l i ,  p and Precision, 
Combining equations (12), (15) and (16) results in: 
Or: 
WRIP = U - F (x, p,  N) - xe - K1 (pN) Log ( p N )  - 
Equation (17) will be used to provide comparative statics to analyze the 
impact of factors such as Level of Precision, Cost of Technology and Market 
Size on buyer surplus. 
As before, three different market sizes (large, medium and small) and 
three different technology cost regimes, high, moderate and small will be 
considered. In addition, three different Inspection Cost (e)  regimes (high, 
moderate and small) will also be considered to examine the effect of cost of 
inspection on market welfare and optimal levels of Precision and Recall. The 
impact of precision and recall under these conditions will be investigated by 
employing comparat ive statics. 
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Impact of Cost of Technology: As technology costs increases, the costs 
of operating a search engine increase. A larger market (greater number of 
products) would result in greater processing costs, but would also increase 
buyer surplus by featuring candidate products with lower disutility. When 
the two opposing trends are balanced, it is found that as market size increases, 
buyers are better off when the search engine's recall is lower (under any 
technology cost regime). This implies that the additional cost dominates the 
additional surplus generated by a larger market. In fi,pre 3, below the effect 
of cost of technology and market size on the welfare mcmimizing level of recall 
(under moderate inspection cost) is displayed. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
It is clear that for all three technology cost regimes, the size of the market 
and the optimal level of recall move in the opposite directions. Further, the 
decline in optimal recall level is sharper as the cost of technology increases. 
The optimal level of recall under the Low Technology cost regime is hgher 
for any given market size than the corresponding level of recall under the 
High Technology cost reginn&". I will now define a term that I will use in 
the remainder of this paper. Effective Market Size refers to the actual 
number of products that a buyer can search for in an electronic market. It is 
the product of recall ( p )  and the Market Size (N). If the number of products 
in the buyer's search domain is 1000 and the recall of the search engine is 0.2, 
then the effective market size is p x N = 0.2 x 1000 = 200. From figure 3, it is 
evident that as the market size increases, optimal recall declines so that the 
change in Eflective Market Size is relatively much smaller. This observation 
will be used to explain two important phenomena in electrorlic markets. 
Are there benefits to  restricting buyer choice? When buyer choice is 
measured by the Effective Market Size, it appears there is enough evidence 
from figure 3, to  support the argument that, in larger markets, higher levels 
of recall would result in greater Effective Market Sizes, but the resulting total 
"'There is a small portion of the graph where this is not so. This is not because 
of deviations from theoretical prediction as much as a 'smoothing error' created when 
disc~ete values generated by a simulation were joined into a graph using a graph plotter. 
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welfare of the market would be sub-optimal. At lower levels of recall, the 
total welfare of the market would be maximized, but the resulting effective 
market size will also be smaller. Intuitively this can be explained as follows. 
The marginal benefit (to the buyer) of an increase in Market Size N tis less 
than the marginal cost (incurred by the buyer and/or seller) of an increase 
in market size N. Table 3: below provides further evidence in support of the 
argurnent (the figures for moderate and high inspection costs are very similar 
and the data will be furnished by the author on request) 
Table 3:Technology Costs, Optimal Recall and Total Welfare 
(under Low Inspection Cost) 
Tech Costs Regime 
Market Size 
Small I Medium / Large 
.2 I I Optimal Recall 
Low Tech Costs 
0.85997 
0.86 1 0.172 1 0.086 
86 
0.85997 
Moderate tech Costs 
Optimal Welfare 
I I I 
From Table 3 above, the following effects can be seen: 
Optimal Recall 
Effective Mkt. Size 
High Tech Costs 
1. The welfare maximizing effective size of the market is almost indepen- 
dent of the market size N and is influenced by the technology costs 
more than any other factor. The greater the technology costs the lower 
the optimal level of recall and hence the smaller the Effective Market 
size. 
0.73969 
2. The welfare lost when technology costs increase cannot be compensated 
by a decrease in the optimal level of recall (and therefore a smaller 
Effective Market size). 
0.2 
20 
Optimal Recall 
Effective Mkt. Size 
Optimal Welfare 
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0.73969 
0.044 
2 2 
0.73969 
0.1 
10 
.54455 
0.022 
22 
0.011 
6 
0.54455 
0.006 
6 
0.54455 
The above observations indicate that a lower effective market size may 
lead to less choice for buyers but will nevertheless, lead to optimal market 
welfare. In situations where technological costs associated with operating 
a search engine are high, the expected gain to buyers from each additional 
product in the market can be less than the cost of indexing, storing and 
retrieving the product via an electronic search engine. Such cases typically 
occur when the market size is moderate or large. It can be seen from Table 
3, that higher market sizes are associated with very low recall. This implies 
that by covering only a small fraction of the products available in the market, 
providers31 'of the search engine restrict buyer choice to a significant extent 
and maximize total welfare in the market. In the case of products that are 
highly information rich where the cost of processing each product and storing 
it in a database as we11 as accurate internal representation of the product for 
retrieval by a querying mechanism is likely to be high, the market is better 
served by limiting buyer choice. The alternative may be either increased 
operational costs or inaccurate and imprecise representation of the product 
resulting in poor precision. T h s  leads us to the second question that we wish 
to address. 
Which factor has greater impact on Total Welfare; Recall o r  Pre-  
cision? To answer this question, it is necessary to investigate the levels 
of precision that maximize total welfare under different market conditions. 
Table 4, below shows the impact of Market size and technology cost types on 
Optimal levels of recall and precision under the low inspection cost regime 
(since the results and trends discussed here are identical for the other two 
inspection cost regimes, the corresponding data are not shown here and will 
be furnished the author on request). 
Table 4:Technology Costs, Optimal Recall and Precision (under 
Low Inspection Cost) 
3 1 ~ h e  question of who will provide the search engine will be addressed in the sections 
that follow. 
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-- -- 
Optirnal %!call Moderate Tech Costs 0.2 Optimai Precisio~ 0.99 0.99 
I - _.___-.----+_ 
Tech Costs Regime 
Low Tech Costs 
- - --- 
From Table 4: above, the following conclusions can be made: 
I Market Size 
High Tech Costs 
1. The welfare maximizing leve! of precision is independent of the market 
:;,e (N) or the magnitude of technology costs and is a,lrnost equal to 
perfect precision. 
/ Small 
Optimal Recall I 0.86 
2. In direct contrast to precision, optimal recall declines with increase in 
both market size and technology c ~ s t s  and in larger markets or under 
hgher technology cost regimes, it is relatively small. 
Optimal Recall 
Optimal Precision 
These observations support the argument that bigher precision is far more 
important than recall or market size from the staridpoint of maximizing mar- 
ket welfare. 111 the ca.se of products that are information rich or those that are 
chc,:acterized by relatively hgh ambiguity in product description or terms of 
trade, buyers are better off with a search engine that may cover a smaller mar- 
ket ir return for accurate representafkr &rid ranking of pr~dncts  retrieved 
by the search. In other words, as  the product conzplemty o r  uncertazr~ty zn, 
t e rms  of h d e  Increases, buyers stand t o  gazn when the search engjne trades 
08 varzety o r  extent  of market  coz~prage for accuracy of ranking ar2d repre- 
sentatzon. 
O~tirnal P~.erision / / 0.99 , 0 99 1 0.991 
Medium 
0.172 
5.1 Incentives for Providing Search Engine Services 
Large 
0.086 
0.1 
0.99 
This section addresses incentives related issues by examining the conditions 
under which a seller or a coalition o< sellers will provide search engine services 
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I 
0.01 1 
0.99 
- 
0.006 
0.991 
free of cost to  buyers. I will first investigate the conditions under which it 
is optimal for a single seller to provide search engine services to the market 
and then extend the results to a coalition of sellers. 
5.1.1 Dominant Seller 
The same model of electronic market that was used in the earlier section is 
used here. A new concept of 'Dominant Seller' is introduced as  an addition to 
the model. The seller with the largest fraction of products within the buyer's 
search domain is called the dominant seller in this model. It is assumed that 
there is a single seller who offers the largest fraction of products within the 
buyer's search domain. The following modelling primitives will now be added 
to the model: 
1. The fraction of products offered by the dominant seller = f .  If there 
are 100 products in the buyer's Search Domain and f = 0.25, then the 
dominant seller offers 25 products within the search domain. 
2. The products offered by the dominant seller are uniformly distributed 
within the buyer's search domain. 
3. The same seller is the dominant seller for all buyers. This means that in 
the search domain of every buyer (not just some buyers) the dominant 
seller offers the largest fraction of products. An alternate way of stating 
this is to say that the dominant seller offers a fraction f of all products 
in the product space and her offerings are distributed u n z f o m l y  through 
the product space. 
4. Collaboration between sellers is costly due to a variety of causes ranging 
from regulatory constraints to coordination costs and therefore, sellers 
cannot cooperate in offering a search engine jointly. 
5. The dominant seller offers the search engine to all buyers. He allows 
all sellers access to the search engine. The search engine has a recall 
factor that is less than unity and as before, it covers only a fraction 
of the products in the market. However, the search does not discrim- 
inate in a n y  systematic way against any particular seller. It does not 
misrepresent the estimated disutility of any seller offering (either the 
dominant seller's or other sellers' offerings) when ranking the products 
retrieved by the search. 
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6. The dominant seller first selects all his products and stores them in 
the search engine's searchable database. If the optimal recall level 
for the market is p and the dominant seller's market share Is f ,  thy 
fraction of the market that is now available for other sellers = p - f .  
The following example illustrates the principle. If the optimal level of 
recall, p = 0.1 and the dominant seller offers 2% of the products in the 
market (f == 0.02), then the fraction of the market that is now available 
to other sellers = 8% (0.08). The probability that a given seller's good 
will be covered by the search engine in this situation = p -- f = 0.08. 
The dominant seller ensures that his prodccts are always covered by 
the search engine32. The dominant seller zmproves the chances of his 
product being the candidate product by ofjCemng the search engine. 
5.1.2 Profits to the Dominant Seller 
In this section an expression will be derived that measures the va!ue of the 
search engine to the dominant seller (his additional profits from offering the 
search engine) The objective of the analysis here 1s not to comment on the 
actual profits to the dominant seller lmder specific market conditions, but to 
identify the conditions under which the dominanls seller will find it optimal 
to offer search engine services to parttit:1varns 1x1 dn electronic rnmket and 
to examine if other sellers can offer z:xh C;~~V:C,$S 111 c o r n ~ e t ~ t r ~ n  with the 
dominant seller. 
When the search engine is offered by third parties, the profits to the 
dominant seller, represented by rNS are given 
- 
3 2 ~ h i s  however, does not imply that the Dominant Seller's product will necessar~ly be 
selected for purchase by a buyer. 
3 3 ~ h ; s  ;i derived as follows. If i products of the Dominant Seller are retrieved by thz 
Search Engine, then the probability that one these products will be the candidate product 
is given by:-?- and the expected profit: + x P* 
pN. The probab~lity that i products out O[;N products will he retrieved is given by: 
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This profits that would accrue to the dominant seller if he were to provide 
the search enginez4 :
For rS to be positive, it is necessary for the following inequality to hold: 
The gain to the dominant seller from offering Search Engine services, 
GS (f)  , is given by: 
=+- G (f)  = ( )  * - K1 (pN) Log (pN) - ~ 2 p ~  
f 
- c [p.(l - ) f -  ( f )  [; P* jj 
i=O 
For the gain to be positive, the following inequality should hold. 
K1 (pN) Log (pN) + K2p2 + [XI$ [pi (1 - p) (f N-2) (f" )-L~*]]] 
P* 2 (9 
* P*> K1 (pN) Log (PN) +K2p2 ( (;) - [ci- [P" 1 - P) (f N-4 (f" $11) 
Therefore, expected profits are given by: 
3 4 ~ t  is assumed that p > f .  If not, no other seller's product would be featured by the 
search engine, and other sellers would turn to a third party for providing the electronic 
market. 
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This result can be restated in terms of the dominant seller's Market Share 
as follows: 
p ( K ~  (pN) Log ( p N )  + K2p2 + P* 
- P )  ( f ~ - i )  (ffi) 511 ) 
f 2  P* 
(23) 
For the dominant seller to offer search engine services, it is sufficient if 
inequality (22) holds, since the earlier condition (inequality (21)) is implied 
by (22)- 
From equation (23), it follows that greater the market share of the dom- 
inant seller, greater is the likelihood that he will offer the search engine free 
of cost to buyers. 
Can Other Sellers Provide Search Engine Services? Suppose there 
are a certain number of sellers in the market (in addtion to the dominant 
seller) each of whom offered a certain fraction of the products in the market, 
$1) f2,  f3)  ...fk such that: f > fl > f2  2 f3 > ...fk and their corresponding 
gains in offering the search engine is given by: G( f ) ,  G( fi) -. .G( fk) . 
From equation (21), it can be shown that Gain, GS ( f )  is increa~ing"~ m 
f for 'd f E [O,l]. This implies that the greater the market share of the search 
provzder, the greater is  his gain. 
Therefore, the following condition holds: 
As a result, it follows that if various sellers provide search engine services, 
the dominant seller's gain is  the greatest. 
If the dominant seller offers discounts equal3 to G(fl) to  buyers, all 
buyers would use his search engine and ignore other seller sponsored search 
engines. 
 he proof of this claim will be made available by the author on request. 
' . 
J6The discount would have to be greater than G ( f i ) ,  but at a limiting value of G( f i ) ,  
all other seller sponsored search engines would fail to attract any buyers. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-98-26 
6 Conclusions 
The modeling and analysis provide explanatory insights into the three issues 
that motivated this research. Each issue will be addressed separately and 
the findings discussed. In analyzing the business impact of this research, 
some important developments in electronic commerce, such as personaliza- 
tion of market sites and constraints in selling information rich products will 
be discussed. The impact of factors such as cost of technology, market size 
(number of seller offerings) and the market share of dominant sellers will be 
discussed. 
6.1 Impact of Recall, Precision and Dominant Seller's 
Market Share on Buyers and Sellers 
The three research questions addressed by this research are directly related 
to the impact of search technology on the market. The questions will first 
be raised and answered and then the managerial insights that follow as a 
consequence will be discussed in detail. It is important to note that ranking 
accuracy is directly related to precision. Greater precision leads to higher 
ranking accuracy and a relatively low level of precision leads to low ranking 
accuracy. In order to investigate how Ranking Accuracy impacts buyers and 
sell~rs, it will suffice if the impact of precision on total welfare is analyzed. 
1. W h a t  is t h e  impact of Recall and  Precision o n  Buyers and  
Sellers? 
Irk a market where search engine teclinology has no operational or devel- 
opmental costs associated with it, higher recall leads to  greater total welfare 
in the market. ,Since this situation unrealistic, the optimal recall level of the 
search engine will be limited by the cost of technology. In larger markets, the 
level of optimal recall is relatively !ow, indicating that as market size rises, 
the level of optimal recall declines rapidly. It is clear from Figure-2, that as 
technology costs increase, the level of optimal recall falls. From Figure 3, it 
can be seen that even when the search engine's precision is perfect, the cost 
of technology makes it sub-optimal to have higher levels of recall in moderate 
and large sized markets. In general, as the market size increases, the optimal 
l e w  of recall declines. And from Figure 3, it is clear that the decline in 
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optimal level of recall is steeper when the cost of search technology increases. 
The finding with respect to precision is exactly the opposite. The size of the 
market, the cost of technology and the cost of human inspection etc. have 
almost no impact on the optimal precision level. It is clear from Table 4, that 
the welfare maximizing level of precision is consistently high irrespective of 
the size of the market or cost of technology while the optimal level of recall 
varies greatly depending on both factors. These observations lead us to key 
findings of this research. 
In large and moderate sized markets total welfare is maximized by 
limiting the size of recall to low levels. 
In comparatively smaller markets, welfare is maximized when the search 
engine has a relatively higher level of recall. 
The optimal level of Precision is independent of market size and tech- 
nology costs. At a consistently high level of precision, the total welfare 
of the market is maximized. 
2. When cost of technology induces a trade-off between Recall 
and Precision, which factor has greater impact on buyer wel- 
fare? 
It is clear from Tables 3 and 4, that while precision remains unaffected 
under different technology cost regimes and market sizes, the level of optimal 
recall is highly sensitive to increase in technology costs and declines rapidly 
with increases in market size. The value to the buyer of an additional product 
in the search engine's database is less than the operational costs incurred in 
representing it accurately within a searchable database and retrieving it when 
the database is queried. The impact on the buyer of the trade-off between 
Recall and Precision cam be summarized as follows: 
In a small market, welfare is maximized by having relatively high levels 
of Precision and Recall. 
In large or medium sized markets, the total welfare is maximized when 
Precision is high and Recall is low. 
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As the cost of tech.nolog-y increases, welfare is maximized by lowering 
Recall but providing a high level of Precision. 
3. Under What conditions will a seller (or sellers) offer search 
engine services free of cost to buyers? 
It is clear from that the analysis that followed equation (23), that greater 
the market share of the dominant seller, greater was the likelihood that he 
would offer free search engine services to buyers. The thrust of this research 
is to investigate if there are conditions under whch the seller would offer free 
search engine services to buyers. The dominant seller can attempt t o  charge 
fees for the usage of the search engine, only if there i s  n o  other seller i n  with 
a market share barge enough to profit by onering the search engine. 
If there were one or more sellers with market shares fi such that GS( f )  > 
GS(f,) > 0, then not only will the seller have t o  provide the search engine for 
free, but also o f e r  discounts (or equivalent side payments) to buyers37 w-hch 
are at least equal to Gs(fi), where fi is the market share of the seller with 
the second highest market share. 
.I factor that was instrumental in establishing this result was that co- 
ordination and collaboration between multiple sellers is costly enough to be 
unviable. In the case of a market with many sellers having very small mar- 
ket shares, this may well be the case. However, if the collaboration between 
individual sellers were not prohibitively expensive and permitted under the 
regulatory regime, i t  can be shown that the coalition of sellers that oSfers the 
search engine will have t o  include the dominant seller38. 
6.1.1 Managerial Insights and Implications for Businesses 
From the analysis in the proceeding section, it is clear that markets that 
trade-off buyer choice for enhanced accuracy are likely to deliver greater 
value to buyers. It can be seen in currently operational electronic markets for 
Airline Tickets, such as Expedia and Travelocity, that market that provides 
37Who buy the Dominant Seller's product(s). 
"under the assumption that the cost of collaboration between any two sellers is iden- 
tical. 
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better accuracy tends to attract more buyers. Expedia offers less choice than 
~ r a v e l o c i t ~ ~ ~  but its search interface is friendlier and the results are far more 
accurate. Recent analyses in the trade press [Penenberg 19981 cite Expedia's 
superior search engine features as having contributed to its higher market 
share. Similarly, Auto-by-Tel, an electronic market for used cars, offers an 
easy to operate search engine interface and accurate retrieval based on buyer 
specifications. Recent articles in the trade press[Gelsi 19971 point to these 
factors in explaining the success of this market. 
Cybermalls, retailers of differentiated products and merchants who offer 
search intensive merchandise such as books, music, airline tickets and cars 
would benefit greatly by offering buyers accurate search features. In the 
case of information rich products ( such as expert analyses of events and 
trends, analyst reports, financial news and reports etc.) and/or products 
characterized by complexity of description (such as SLR Cameras, hand held 
digital devices, PC's etc.) or ambiguity in terms of trade (airline tickets, 
vacation packages, investment services, legal services) search engine providers 
have strong reasons to trade-off market coverage for enhanced accuracy. 
Customization of Electronic Markets: Customization of electronic mar- 
kets has been a recent trend that has received considerable attention from 
the trade press and industry analysts. Many customized markets offer buyers 
a fraction of the products found in the market but customize their offering 
to precisely match buyer needs. A recent report in the trade press [Hof 19981 
suggested that in search intensive markets for products such as music, infor- 
mation and airline tickets, customers are offered a smaller choice in exchange 
for precise match with customer preferences. The strategy of Portals such 
as 'Excite' [Hof 19981 centers on minimizing costly buyer inspection by mak- 
ing the search engine (in this case Excite's database of profiles) preprocess 
content to produce a close degree of fit between buyer preferences and prod- 
ucts (information) retrieved. This research explains why this is a profitable 
strategy and predicts that increasingly, this will be the trend in markets for 
information rich or search intensive products. 
3gA random choice of 3 international and 3 domestic (within US) travel itineraries were 
made and Expedia and Travelocity were compared. While Expedia generally features 
fewer offerings, it is quite possible that for certain destinations, Expedia offers a greater 
choice of tickets. The above exercise is not be construed as a rigorous sampling effort 
conducted to prove propositions. There are numerous reports in the Trade press however, 
that make the same point. 
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Free Search Engine Services Most of the electronic markets that are 
currently operational offer buyers free search services. The findings in the 
preceding sections explain the conditions under whch sellers stand to gain by 
offering buyers free search services. It is clear that when there are multiple 
sellers with significant market shares, no single seller will be able to charge 
buyers for search engine services. Further, given that in large markets buyer 
gain in including additional products in a search engine's repository is min- 
imal, a dominant seller can maximize his expected revenue by strategically 
including a larger fraction of his products in the search engine's database or 
by adopting other methods to ensure that his products enjoy a higher proba- 
bility of being selected as the canhdate product. Such a development was in 
fact, observed when American Airlines introduced its SABRE airline reser- 
vation system, wherein American Airlines's products were featured ahead of 
competing airlines' offerings. These factors alone are enough to ensure higher 
seller profits and incentivize sellers to offer free search services to buyers. 
6.2 Directions for Future Research 
Almost all currently operational electronic markets feature considerable price 
dispersion across different products and for the same product across different 
sellers. T h s  research is being extended to investigate the impact of search 
engine technology on a market characterized by price dispersion. Search 
engines may offer hfferent levels of precision depending on whether buyers 
search for product or price information. The impact of such context depen- 
dent precision, on buyer surplus is an area that requires further research. 
Customization of buyer sites can result in significant benefits to buyers. It 
can also provide sellers with an accurate estimate of buyers reserve utility 
and enable them to indulge in price discrimination. The trade-offs between 
reducing buyers' search and inspection costs and giving sellers the power to 
price discriminate has welfare implications which are being investigated by 
my current research. 
The advent of Intelligent agents and advances in collaborative filtering 
techniques have made it easier for sellers to search for buyers. This research 
can be extended to investigate the impact of intelligent agents on sellers' 
pricing strategies. 
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Appendix A 
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Tech Costs Regime Type 
Low Tech Costs Regime 
Moderate tech Costs Regime 
High Tech Costs Regime 
Optimal Recall 
Effective Mkt. Size 
Optimal Recall 
Effective Mkt. Size 
Optimal Recall 
Effective Mkt. Size 
Market Size 
Small 
0.86 
86 
0.2 
20 
0.1 
10 
Medium 
0.172 
86 
0.044 
22 
0.011 
6 
Large 
0.086 
86 
0.022 
22 
0.006 
6 
Impact of Market Size on Welfare Maximizina Level of Recall Under the Moderate 
Technoloav Cost Reaime 
N = I00 N = 500 
Recall Recall 
N = 1000 W e l f a r e -  
Recall 
Figure 2: Market Size, Recall and Welfare 
44 
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I 200 400 600 800 1000 
Market Size 
Hiah Cost Moderate Cost Low Cost - - - -  
Regime Regime Regime 
Figure 3: Welfare Maximizing Level of Recall under Different Cost Regimes 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-98-26 
References 
[Anderson 971 
[Bakos 19871 
[Bakos 19911 
[Bakos 19973 
[Carpoint 19981 
[CNet 19981 
[Depalma 19791 
[Diamond 19711 
[Expedia 19981 
[Gelsi 19971 
[Greenhut 19871 
[Hof 19983 
Anderson,C.; "In search of the perfect mar- 
ket" ; www.economist .com/editorial/freefora11/14-9- 
97/ecl.html 
Bakos, J. Y. ; "Interorganizational Information Sys- 
tems: Strategic Opportunities for Competition and 
Cooperation." Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT Sloan School 
of Management, November 1987. 
Bakos, J. Y.; "A Strategic Analysis of Electronic Mar- 
ketplaces" ; MIS Quarterly, September 1991. 
Bakos, Y.; "Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implica- 
tions for Electronic Marketplaces"; Management Sci- 
ence, December 1997. 
Carpoint .corn; http://'WWW.CarPoint .com 
CNet .corn; http://www.cnet.com 
Takahashi T.  and de Palma, A.,; "A Unified Treat- 
ment of the Segment and the Circular Models; Does 
Economic Space Matter," ; pp 248-273. 
Diamond, P.A. "A model of price adjustment ," ; Jour- 
nal of Economic Theory(3), 1971, pp. 156-168. 
Gelsi, S. ;" Kicking Tires", Forbes, 07/23/97; 
h t t p : / / w w w . f o r b e s . c o m / t o o l / h t m l / 9 7 / j ~ m  
Greenhut, M.L., G. Norman, C.-S. Hung; "The eco- 
nomics of imperfect competition: A spacial ap- 
proach"; Cambridge: Cambridge University press - 
1987. 
Hof, R.D., Green, H., Himelstein, L.;"Now 
it's Your Web"; Businessweek, 10/05/98; 
http://wtvw. businessweek. com/1998/40/specrep.htm 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-98-26 
[Hogg 19951 Hogg, R.V. and Craig, A.T. ; "Introduction to Mathe- 
matical Statistics" , Prentice Hall, Fifth Edition, pp. 
198-199. 
- .  
[Hot elling 19291 Hotelling, H.; "Stability in Competition"; Economic 
Journal, vol 39, pp 41-57. 
[Penenberg 19981 Penenberg, A.L.; "Expedia 
gets rave" , Forbes 02/27/98; 
http://www.forbes.com/tool/html/98/feb/O227/side2. htm 
[Pinkerton 19941 Pinkerton, B.; "Finding What People Want: Ex- 
periences with the Webcrawler"; Paper presented 
at the Second International WVVW Conference 1994 
http://info.webcrawler.com/bp/WTNW94.html 
[Salop 19771 Salop, S. and Stiglitz, J.E.; "'Bargains and Rip-offs: 
A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dis- 
persion" ; Review of economic studies (44), October 
1977, pp. 493-510. 
[S tigler 19611 Stigler, G. ; "The economics of Information", Journal 
of political economy (69), June 1961, pp. 213-225. 
[Travelocity 19981 Travelocity.com; h t t p : / / ~ . ~ a v e 1 o C i t y . c o m  
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-98-26 
